English Name: Marilda Antonia de Oliveira Sotomayor
玛丽尔达-奥利维拉-索托马约尔（Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor）是巴西数学家和经济学家。
索托马约尔在巴西里约热内卢长大。她最初就读于里约热内卢联邦大学，并于 1967 年获得数学学位。索托马约尔在纯数学和应用数学学院继续深造，并于 1972 年获得数学硕士学位。1981 年，她获得里约热内卢天主教大学数学博士学位。
玛丽尔达-索托马约尔专门研究博弈论、匹配市场和市场设计。她是巴西唯一一位同时精通博弈论和匹配市场的专家。
External Link
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Google Scholar
Two-sided matching
AE Roth, M Sotomayor
Handbook of game theory with economic applications 1, 485-541
3997 Multi-item auctions
G Demange, D Gale, M Sotomayor
Journal of political economy 94 (4), 863-872
799 Some remarks on the stable matching problem
D Gale, M Sotomayor
Discrete Applied Mathematics 11 (3), 223-232
553 Ms. Machiavelli and the stable matching problem
D Gale, M Sotomayor
The American Mathematical Monthly 92 (4), 261-268
256 The college admissions problem revisited
AE Roth, M Sotomayor
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 559-570
214 Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
M Sotomayor
Mathematical social sciences 38 (1), 55-70
189 A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis
AE Roth, M Sotomayor
Econometric Society Monographs 18
132 A further note on the stable matching problem
G Demange, D Gale, M Sotomayor
Discrete Applied Mathematics 16 (3), 217-222
101 The multiple partners game
M Sotomayor
Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honour of David Gale, 322-354
83 A non-constructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
M Sotomayor
Games and Economic Behavior 13 (1), 135-137
81 The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
M Sotomayor
International Journal of Game Theory 28, 567-583
74 Implementation in the many-to-many matching market
M Sotomayor
Games and Economic Behavior 46 (1), 199-212
72 Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
M Sotomayor
Journal of Economic Theory 134 (1), 155-174
48 A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
M Sotomayor
International Journal of Game Theory 31 (2), 269-283
45 Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
M Sotomayor
Mathematical Social Sciences 39 (2), 119-132
45 Two-sided matching: study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis
MAO Sotomayor
Cambridge University Press
44 Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
M Sotomayor
International Journal of Game Theory 32, 241-251
43 A simple selling and buying procedure
D Pérez-Castrillo, M Sotomayor
41 The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
M Sotomayor
International Journal of Game Theory 36 (3-4), 621-640
39 Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
AE Roth, M Sotomayor
Journal of Economic Theory 45 (1), 85-101
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